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THE ARAB UPRISINGS AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
ASIAN MIGRANT WORKERS IN LEBANON 
 
 
Middle East revolutions of the 2010s against authoritarianism and corruption were quickly 
labelled part of the “struggle for democracy.” While the term was used in vague and often 
contradictory manners by opponents of the incumbent regimes, street protesters and 
foreign supporters, its implications are manifold. As explained by T. H. Marshall in 1950, the 
struggle for democracy implies fighting for three sorts of rights: political rights, civil rights 
and social rights.1 In the Middle East, ideas of citizenship and equality before the law are 
more often than not challenged because of overwhelming social and economic inequalities. 
Among the citizens of a state and among the inhabitants of a country, who is entitled to 
social welfare, health and education? How do the inequalities of access to these rights 
interfere with the respect of political and civil rights? How do they contribute to 
representations of the self as a citizen, of the citizens as a nation, of the state as a common 
good? 
 
                                                 
1 As reminded by Anh Nga Longva, “Citizenship in the Gulf State. Conceptualization and Practice”, in 
Nils August Butenschøn, Uri Davis, Manuel Sarkis Hassassian (eds), 2000, Citizenship and the state in 
the Middle East: Approaches and Applications, New York: Syracuse University Press, p. 184,  quoting 
T. H. Marshall, 1950, Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge University Press. 
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Such questions appear obvious in several Gulf States where foreign workers have long 
brought a crucial contribution to economic growth while remaining excluded from national 
rights and wealth. By contrast, they remained understudied in the Arab Levant until recently. 
Still, the labour market in Lebanon can be considered quite similar to the labour markets in 
Kuwait or Bahrain; the economy of Lebanon can be considered a rent economy comparable 
to those of the Gulf States; and the legal status and practical treatment of foreign workers in 
Lebanon obey the same rules known in the Gulf as kafala (sponsorship). Moreover, in 
Lebanon, like in the Gulf States, the foreign workers’ issue underlines flaws in national 
building and contributes to the fragmentation of domestic ethnic and confessional groups. 
Lebanon has often been labelled a ‘microcosm’ of the Middle East, a place to study events 
and trends which would soon spread in the Arab East. In this time of social upheaval and 
political change in the Arab world, the case of Lebanon and the current situation of Asian 
migrant workers in Lebanon might offer an insight into the future of the Gulf states.  
 
An often heard self-satisfied comment on the Uprisings in the surrounding Arab countries is 
either that Lebanon, having long been a paragon of democracy did not need a revolution like 
its neighbors or, alternatively, that it was the first nation in the Arab world to lead a 
successful popular intifadha in the Spring of 2005, which obtained the rapid withdrawal of 
the Syrian occupation forces.  
Eight years later this optimistic judgment remains questionable: notwithstanding the 
dramatic episodes of the summers of 2006 (the Israeli war over Lebanon) and 2007 (the 
army war against an Islamist insurgency in Nahr al-Barid), the local political scene is 
characterized by a toxic stalemate between two rival coalitions: the “8 March” parties 
dominated by Hezbollah and supported by Syria and Iran; and the “14 March” forces under 
the leadership of the Hariri’s Future Party which is allied with the Saudis and the West. Since 
2005, expectations for constitutional reform and public accountability have diminished year 
by year, and street politics have turned more violent every year. 
Yet, the Arab Uprisings, especially the demonstrations in Tahrir square in Cairo and the 
mobilizations in Syria have resounded in civil society associations in Lebanon as well as 
among militant organizations. “Here *in Lebanon+, it was heard, we don’t suffer from one 
dictator but from eighteen [in reference to the leaders of legally empowered confessional 
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groups+.” 2 Calls for constitutional reform, the suppression of the sectarian system and 
reining in its ruling elite mobilized more than 3,000 people on 27 February 2011, 10,000 and 
25,000 people on 6 and March 20, in rallies called respectively by Leftist, democratic secular 
collectives, independent activists and political parties such as the Lebanese Communist Party 
(LCP) and the People’s Movement.3 It was the birth of several campaigns and gatherings 
outside the 14 and 8 March polarisation and the classical left. Civil movements were mainly 
motivated by the inability of Lebanon’s ruling class to deliver structural reform. The 
movements acquired new layers of activists around the country, such as the Haqqi ‘alayyi 
(‘my right’) campaign in Beirut, the ‘Tripoli without arms campaign’, the ‘Civil Forum’ in the 
Biqaa, and the ’Amal mubashar (‘Direct Action’), a coalition of independent activists in 
Beirut, the Biqaa and the Shuf. However contradictions soon started to surface, as radical 
groups argued that a more revolutionary movement was needed to continue the battle to 
bring down the whole system. Political parties from both 14 and 8 March also tried to hijack 
the movement and, finally, the revolt against the regime in Syria added a new problem: 
whether or not to support it? As the deadline for organising quadrennial legislative elections 
approached, controversies over the Electoral law stiffened, showing the underlying 
fragmentation and paralysis of the political class. Distrust and despair delegitimized the 
political arena.  
The capacity for political mobilization and the long history of political engagement noticed 
by social scientists4 seemed to have run out of steam after the national elections in 2009. In 
contrast, one could observe a steady increase in the voicing and actions of labour unions and 
civil society organisations in defence of labourers and employees, protesting against low 
salaries, unemployment, the lack of health coverage, the rising cost of basic commodities 
and the deterioration of working conditions. Beyond the negative effects of the deepening 
political crisis and financial uncertainty, social conditions have steadily deteriorated over the 
                                                 
2 For a reflection on authoritarianism in post-war Lebanon see Farid El-Khazen, 2003, “The Postwar 
Political Process: Authoritarianism by Diffusion”, in T. Hanf, N. Salam (eds.), Lebanon in Limbo. 
Postwar Society and State in an Uncertain Regional Environment, Baden-Baden, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 53-74. 
3 Marie-Noëlle AbiYaghi, 2012, « Civil Mobilisation and Peace in Lebanon,” http://www.c-
r.org/accord-article/civil-mobilisation-and-peace-lebanon  accessed 25 January 2014. 
4 Karam Karam, 2009, “An Analysis of Political Change in Lebanon in the Light of Recent Mobilization 
Cycles”, in Laura Guazzone, Daniela Pioppi (eds.), The Arab State and Neo-liberal Globalization. The 
Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East, Reading, Ithaca Press, pp. 47-73.  
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past half-decade while the Lebanese were enduring the consequences of the world 
economic crisis and the Arab Uprisings.5  
Therefore, social mobilisation, which had long remained contained by the confessional 
political leadership, hit the headlines in spite of the low level of unionisation.6 In the early 
2010s, “signs of life in various labour movements” suggested that “Lebanon’s stillborn 
revolution” might lead up to a substitution of social mobilization for the aborted political 
struggle.7 Electricity contract workers carried out the longest workers’ uprising in Lebanon’s 
modern history; public school teachers and the Union Coordination Committee representing 
teachers, professors, and public administration staff and retirees, led weeks of strike and 
protest; workers and employees in the Spinneys supermarkets announced the much 
publicised and widely supported creation of a new union; Beirut municipality employees, 
soon followed by their co-workers in Beiteddine and Tripoli, demonstrated in the streets; the 
bank employees’ association took escalatory steps to bring the banks association to agree to 
renew their collective labour agreement, etc.8 Indeed labour and unionism issues became 
subjects of mass contest as in the other Arab Uprisings.9 
 
This trend could be noticed parallel to another one on the Lebanese scene: mobilizations in 
favour of foreign workers. While human rights associations proliferated in the wake of the 
civil war,10 the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 gave them a new boost, especially for advocacy 
groups such as Ruwwad (2004) which cares for imprisoned refugees and illegal migrants, 
Kafa (2005) which opened a branch devoted to migrant workers in 2010, or al-Mufakkira al-
Qanuniyya (“the Legal Agenda”) founded in 2009 by the well-known lawyer Nizar Saghiyeh.  
                                                 
5 With a national debt up to 58 MM$, no government budget approved since 2006 and a slowing 
down of growth from 5% to 1.5% in 2012. See http://www.lcps-
lebanon.org/publications/1345209118-economic_challenges.pdf accessed 25 January 2014. 
6 Only 5 percent of employees and workers adhere to a union according to Mohammad Zbeeb, 28 
December 2012, “Bid Farewell to a Lebanese Union Impostor”, al-Akhbar English edition. 
7 Rasha Abouzaki, 18 July 2012, “Lebanon’s stillborn Revolution,” al-Akhbar English edition. 
8 These are the most publicised social mobilisation documented and discussed in the daily al-Akhbar 
since April 2012 by journalists from the economic and social desk Rasha Abouzaki, Hassan Chakrani, 
Faten Elhajj, Mouhamad Wehbe, Mohammad Zbeeb and others. 
9 Marie Duboc, 2013, « La question syndicale comme objet contestataire », in Amin Allal, Thomas 
Pierret (drs.), Au coeur de révoltes arabes. Devenir révolutionnaires, Paris, Armand Colin. 
10 Karam Karam, 2006, Le Mouvement Civil au Liban. Mobilisations, protestations et revendications 
associatives dans l'après-guerre, Paris, Karthala. 
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In Lebanon, dozens of such associations11 are working along confessional charity NGOs such 
as Caritas in support of foreign workers, endeavouring to solve judicial and security issues, 
defend their rights and alleviate their harsh daily life. They are organised and powerful, 
make an intensive use of the Internet, and mobilize volunteers and local and international 
donors. An important novelty of the 2010s is that after long restricting their interest to 
(extremely ill-treated) female domestic workers12 these NGOs and associations have become 
aware of the precarious situation of thousands of ‘ummal wafidin13 working in construction, 
agriculture and factories. Although the foreign workers may not play an active role 
themselves, the associations go public and voice complaints and demands that echo those of 
Lebanese workers. 
 
In 2011, World Bank estimates put the total workforce in Lebanon at 1.2 million (for a 
population of around 4.2 million) of whom some 760,000 were foreigners (17.8 percent of 
the population, around 50 percent of the workforce). Direct observation and government 
statistics, however faulty they may be,14 and rough comparisons between figures from the 
Central Administration of Statistics for 1998 quoted by Young (p. 6) and the 2010 estimate 
by the Pastoral Care of Afro-Asian Migrant Workers (PCAAM) quoted in the 2011 CARIM  
Report,15 all show a sharp increase in foreign manpower, and a particular growth in Asian 
labour immigration as well as a new and important African immigration in contrast to the 
global decrease of Arab manpower.  
 
Breakdown of official foreign labour in Lebanon (excluding Syrian & Palestinian) 
 
                                                 
11  Lebanon Support, Daleel Madani. Civil Society Portal. See http://daleel-madani.org  accessed 25 
January 2014. 
12 A choice, one of my interviewees argued, ‘dictated by the feminists, Secretary of State Clinton and 
US funding.’ 
13 Arabic translation for foreign worker. 
14 Studies on the workforce in Lebanon stress the difficulty of access to up to date, reliable and 
significant data on the recruitment and employment of foreign temporary workers (Sensenig-
Dabbous, Hourani, op.cit. p. 2) mainly due to the inability/reluctance of the Lebanese state to publish 
useful statistics. Most of my interviewees and written sources suggested that official figures have to 
be multiplied by three in order to report the real number of foreign workers. According to unofficial 
estimates, the Ministry of Labour delivered 185,000 work permits in 2011 (this figure does not 
include permits for Palestinians or Syrians) – of which 45,000 were for non-domestic jobs. 
15 Martin J. Mc Dermott, 2010, Report of the Committee on Pastoral Care of Afro-Asian Migrant 
(PCAAM) workers in Lebanon to its president Bishop Elias Nassar, quoted in Sensenig, Hourani, p. 39.  
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 1998 2010 
Arabs 23,854 18,755 
Non-Arab Asians 42,042 76,645 
Africans  46,812 
 
Observation of these new trends in the context of diverse but significant Arab revolts led me 
to propose a hypothesis on the current mobilizations in Lebanon. In line with comments by 
specialists on migration in the Middle East who suggested that “there is a thread linking 
protest and international migration,”16 I proposed to make this thread visible and relevant to 
understand the new developments on the social scene in Lebanon. Namely, I noticed that 
the minister of Labour in the “8 March” Miqati government formed in June 2011, Charbel 
Nahas, put together a reform package to ensure the periodic adjustment of wages, to 
redistribute revenue from rentier to productive services, to reinvigorate the role of the 
unions and to create the basis for universal health care in Lebanon. Among other things, 
Nahas argued in favour of respecting international norms relating to the treatment of 
migrant workers.17 He advocated extension of the minimum wage rule to foreign workers 
“not for humanitarian reasons but in order to boost the labour market.”18 Although new in 
Lebanon, such a discourse appeared to fit the “global legalist narrative” of equality, 
secularism and the rule of law developed by transnational forces in accordance with the 
policies of the great powers.19 
                                                 
16 Philippe Fargues, 2011, “Voice after Exit: Revolution and Migration in the Arab World”, Migration 
Information Source, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=839 accessed 25 
January 2014. Before discussing Arab emigration toward Europe, Fargues mentions migration 
processes in the Arab lands generally.  
17 Intervention in a closed seminar on migrant labour, Institut Français du Proche-Orient, 3 November 
2012. The Lebanese authorities have been reluctant to ratify international agreements on migrant 
workers such as the ILO conventions of 1949 and 1955, and the 1990 Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of all Migrant workers and members of their Families. Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous, Guita 
Hourani, 2011, “Towards Effective Temporary Labor Migration Schemes Report on Lebanon and 
Jordan”, CARIM (Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration) Research Report 2001-
08, http://hdl.handle.net/1814/19882 accessed 25 January 2014. 
18 Azfar Khan, senior migration specialist, International Labour Organization, Regional Office for Arab 
States, Beirut. Interview, 9 November 2012. 
19 David Mednicoff, 2012, “The Legal Regulation of Migrant Workers, Politics and Identity in Qatar 
and the UAE”, in Mehran Kamrava, Zahra Babar (eds.), Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf, New-York, 
Columbia/Hurst, pp.187-215.  
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Following the theory of migrations and trans-nationalism inspired by Wallerstein,20 it is 
tempting to see the democratization discourse currently spreading over the Middle East 
impact on the integration of migrant workers in the receiving countries and boost trans-
border social networks. In the case of Lebanon, such promotion of democracy would result 
in empowering the migrants, especially the non-qualified migrants, and reducing the local 
competitiveness of their low salaries. My central hypothesis was that the social scene might 
witness a strategic bridging between Lebanese workers and their unions on the one hand, 
and foreign workers and their associations on the other in order to promote social measures 
to their common benefit. In other words, if there was to be a “revolution” in Lebanon, it 
would be primarily through the spill-over of a social movement across national boundaries, 
by means of the de-sectorisation of contentious politics and the concerted collective action 
of activists who, until then, have rarely cooperated in their struggle against economic and 
political domination. In view of the paralysis of the political sphere, and taking advantage of 
the “conjunctural fluidity of social relations,” the unskilled Lebanese labourers and the 
exploited migrant workers would be able to jointly “mobilize their resources” beyond their 
conflictual sectoral goals in order to lead the country on the path of transition.21 
 
Field research to test this hypothesis was conducted during two fifteen days visits in 
Lebanon, in November 2012 and March 2013. I interviewed stakeholders such as union 
members and leaders in GCLW (General Confederation of Lebanese Workers) and FENASOL 
(Federation of Workers and Employees Unions in Lebanon, a split from GCLW), government 
authorities in the Security Directorate and an ex-minister of Labour. I met ILO (International 
Labour Organization) specialists such as Azfar Khan and Mustafa Said. I visited civil society 
organisations devoted to the support of migrant workers: Frontiers (Ruwwad), Lebanese 
Labour Watch (al-Marsad al-Lubnani li-Huquq al-‘Ummal wal-Muwadhdhafin), Arcenciel and 
Caritas-Lebanon. I corresponded with executives in labour import companies and members 
of the AliBaba network. I discussed with analysts such as Elisabeth Longuenesse (IFPO), Paul 
                                                 
20 Stephen Castles, Mark Miller, 2003, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World, New York, The Guilford Press. Castles’ hypotheses have been deconstructed for 
the Gulf monarchies by Claire Beaugrand, 2010, “Politiques de non-intégration dans les monarchies 
du Golfe. Discuter les raisons de leur pérennité,” Transcontinentales 8/9, 
 http://transcontinentales.revues.org/793 accessed 25 January 2014. 
21 Michel Dobry, 1986,  Sociologie des crises politiques. La dynamique des mobilisations 
multisectorielles, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. 
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Tabar, director of LAU (Lebanese American University) Institute of Migration Studies, Assaf 
Dahdah, a PhD student in anthropology at Université de Provence and Karam Karam 
(Common Space Initiative for Share Knowledge and Consensus Building) 
I was given the opportunity to present my preliminary hypothesis in a seminar at IFPO (3 
November 2012). Participants unanimously stressed that no real de-sectorisation was taking 
place in Lebanon, although the rise in activism and protest I had noticed was beyond 
question. While they did not dismiss the possibility that social mobilisation could successfully 
substitute for political activism in the current deadlock, they concurred in doubting whether 
it would be possible to build a bridge between national and foreign claims, and establish 
cooperation between the two labour sectors. Contacts, interviews and readings, namely of 
Michael Young’s report22 and Mary Kawar’s studies,23 only confirmed these early answers. 
The second seminar on Foreign Workers in Lebanon organised by Elisabeth Longuenesse at 
IFPO (20 March 2013) brought further confirmation with additional comments and elements 
of comprehension. 
Yet, my curiosity remained and my early hypothesis morphed into a new series of questions: 
which elements, which dynamics and conditions explain the current situation of the labour 
market in Lebanon and the endurance of the boundaries between the various categories of 
exploited labour? Should we look into the Lebanese polity or into transnational labour 
networks to understand the current situation? How do the national and the international 
dimensions meet and connect, around which crucial matters, through the mediation of 
which actors? And what could be the consequences of such structure for migrant workers in 
Lebanon and for the Lebanese social fabric? 
Reflecting upon these questions and examining the documentation collected during 
fieldwork led to three complementary tracks of analysis: the political economy of 
globalization without liberalization in countries such as Lebanon requires that the labour 
market remains split into competing segments; while workers from these various segments 
are stuck in a common no-win situation, agents all along the trans-boundary migratory 
                                                 
22 Michael Young, 1999, Migrant Workers in Lebanon, Beirut, The Lebanese NGO forum,            
http://www.lnf.org.lb/migrationnetwork/mig3.html accessed 25 January 2014. 
23 Mary Kawar is an ILO researcher working on issues related to skills and employability, employment 
policy, youth employment and migration in the Arab East. Mary Kawar, Zafiris Tzannatos, 2012, 
“Private Sector Does not Demand Enough Skilled Labor”, LCPS Policy Brief, http://www.lcps-
lebanon.org/publication.php?id=260 accessed 25 January 2014. 
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networks cooperate to their mutual benefit. Therefore, social dynamics and power 
hierarchies have to be assessed on a transnational basis taking into account the strength of 
social networks; the changing ethnoscape and social dynamics within Lebanon’s boundaries 
contribute to weaken the national narrative of the sovereign state if not its very existence.  
 
 
Globalization without liberalization and the split labour market 
Long before the neoliberalism of the Hariri era24 Lebanon was the Middle Eastern paragon of 
a globalized merchant and financial economy.25 Yet, before independence, and more than 
ever after the civil war, the globalization of the Lebanese “free-market” economy did not 
mean liberalization but rather the domination of powerful private interests. It did not imply 
the respect of fair competition and the rule of law by capital owners but rather their 
monopolization of wealth and the clientelization of the polity and society.26  
This monopolistic logic prevailed as far as immigration and labour rights were concerned. 
The current situation of Lebanese legislation, carefully monitored by the ruling elite, is 
telling. The national strategy for inward migration remains extremely cautious and the 
regulatory frameworks dealing with migrant workers can be considered “poor and based on 
continuously changing policies.”27 As mentioned in note 15, Lebanon has not ratified the ILO 
conventions of 1949, 1955, the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1990 convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers. Given the large influx of Palestinian refugees 
on its territory after the 1948-9 war, and given the unruly participation of hundreds of 
thousands of Syrian workers in its economy, it is understood that Lebanon will probably not 
ratify these instruments.28  
                                                 
24 Hannes Baumann, 2012, “The ‘new contractor bourgeoisie’ in Lebanese politics: Hariri, Miqati and 
Faris” in A. Knudsen, M. Kerr (eds.), Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, London: Hurst, pp. 125-44. 
25 Carolyn Gates, 1998, The Merchant Republic of Lebanon: Rise of a Open Economy, London, I. B. 
Tauris. 
26 Reinoud Leenders, 2012, Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State Building in Post-war Lebanon, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press. 
27 The key governmental agencies managing the issue of migrant labour are the general security in 
the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social Affairs. Sensenig-Dabbous, 
Hourani, 2011, op. cit., II.A. Lebanese Government Level, pp. 30-4. 
28 Lebanon currently excludes signing ILO conventions C118 on Equality of Treatment of Nationals 
and non-Nationals in Social Security, C97 on Migration for Employment and C143 on Migrations in 
Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant 
Workers. Yet, it ratified the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
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The resulting informality of the migrant work market fits into the general handling of labour 
issues in Lebanon. According to a 2011 World Bank report, “only 29 percent of Lebanese 
workers earn formal regular wages, the remainder being either informally employed, or self-
employed, or unemployed”.29 It is commonly agreed that this percentage is greater among 
the 60 percent of foreign workers, a large proportion of whom have entered Lebanon 
surreptitiously and illegally through the Syrian border or stayed in the country after 
expiration of their contract and visa.  
Consequently, two main features characterize the foreign labour market in Lebanon: it is a 
split market, and an informal market organised/disorganised for the optimal exploitation of 
human work force. 
 
Taking advantage of the participation of tens of thousands of skilled and unskilled 
Palestinian refugees in the 1950s and 1960s in a buoyant national economy while denying 
them the right to national integration (tawtin) provided an early model of disconnected 
policies for the business community’s handling of foreign workers: “restrictions on the 
Palestinians’ right to work lead to exploitative conditions but do not shut them out of the 
labour market.”30  
The Syrian exception in terms of labour legislation reinforced its segmentation. The Syrian 
pattern of migration and its relationship to the labour market and Lebanese society at large 
differs from those of other Arab migrants such as the Egyptians and Sudanese.  Already in 
the 1970s, Syrian workers were more numerous than the Palestinians and easier to employ 
and dismiss. Affirming a long agreed bilateral policy (1949, 1972) renewed in the 1994 
Labour Agreement (following the 1991 Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and 
Coordination), workers get a three month visa every time they show up at the border and 
are not required to have a work permit or a sponsor (kafil). However, the long political and 
military involvement of the Ba’thist regime in Lebanon during and after the civil war made, 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, of 2000. A. Di Bartolomeo, T. 
Fakhoury, D. Perrin, 2011, “Lebanon, The Demographic-Economic Framework of Migration, The Legal 
Framework of Migration, The Socio-Political Framework of Migration,” CARIM migration profile, 
http://www.carim.org/public/migrationprofiles/MP_Lebanon_EN.pdf accessed 25 January 2014. 
29 Mohammad Zbeeb, “Bid farewell to a Lebanese Union impostor,” al-Akhbar English, 28 December 
2012. 
30 ILO, 2012, Palestinians in Lebanon working but under precarious conditions,     
http://www.ilo.org/beirut/media-centre/news/WCMS_BEY_PR_10_EN/lang--en/index.htm                    
accessed 25 January 2014. 
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and still makes, their case politically sensitive.31 Their number diminished drastically after 
the military withdrawal in 2005 but grew again dramatically when thousands of refugees fled 
their country in turmoil since 2011.32 Beyond a hostile social discourse expressed across all 
confessional groups, they offer a ductile variation margin for the business community, not 
dissimilar to the role played by Pakistani Sunnis and Indian migrant workers in Gulf States 
such as Bahrain.33 
Following the Palestinian and Syrian patterns, national and even ethnic differentiation 
prevailed. The legal and factual differentiation between nationals and foreigners, Arabs and 
non-Arabs, and between various non-Arab nationalities was due to the employers’ approach 
of splitting the market in order to take advantage of differences between native, unionized 
workers and undocumented immigrant, non-unionized workers from poorer countries.34 In 
1971 for example, Ittihad ‘Ummal Balidiyyat Bayrut represented mainly southern Lebanese 
municipality toilers; in the immediate after-war Oger Liban carried on recruiting mainly 
Lebanese for the reconstruction and the street cleaning of downtown Beirut. However, 
progressively in the 1990s, Palestinian and Syrian manpower, then non-Arab migrants took 
over from Lebanese from the peripheral regions in these tasks and other unskilled jobs all 
over the country: in the construction sector and menial jobs in the agricultural and service 
sectors such as gas station attendants, janitors, cleaners, porters or sanitary workers, etc.35 
Year after year, capitalists and managers chose to recruit in foreign countries with lower 
standards of living in search of lower wage demands: Egyptians then Sudanese were 
“imported” in large numbers as well as Philippinos, then Sri Lankans and other Asians 
nationalities. 
                                                 
31 John Chalcraft, 2009, The Invisible cage. Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press. 
32 “Anti-Syrian tide drives workers out of Lebanon,” The New York Times, March 4, 2005 ; 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2009, Lebanon and Syria: Situation of Syrians in Lebanon; 
violence against Syrians; political affiliation of Syrians; naturalization of Syrians in 1994 (1994-
2009), ZZZ103296.E,  http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b7cee9023.html accessed 25 January 2014; 
Fabrice Balanche, “al-’Ummal al-Suriyyun fi Lubnan, Le Monde Diplomatique Arabic Edition, March 
2007; Ahmed Mohsen, “Syrian Workers Eyed with Suspicion after Uprising,” al-Akhbar English 
version,  5 December 2011. 
33 Laurence Louër, 2008,  “The political impact of labour migration in Bahrain,” City & Society 20 (1), 
pp. 32–53, 
34 Edna Bonacich, 1972, « A theory of ethnic antagonism: the split labor market », American 
Sociological Review 37 (5), pp. 547-59. I thank Dr. Louër for directing me to this reference during our 
fruitful discussion in October 2012. 
35 Young, op. cit. 1999, p. 4. 
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A decade later these unskilled jobs have become the almost exclusive preserve of Asian and 
African migrants.36 Field studies show ethnic and national specialisation of tasks by branch of 
activity and within firms, with specific nationalities restricted to specific occupations,37 and 
the clustering of workers of same sex and same origin.38 This allows employers to delegate 
the task of disciplining (in the Foucauldian sense) to the foreigners themselves, who enforce 
norms, statuses and hierarchies partly inspired by their milieu of origin. Besides facilitating 
social control, this strategy of splitting the labour market encourages a global downward 
spiralling of salaries on the national market, because Lebanese labour laws do not govern 
migrant workers’ unskilled services: they rarely reach the minimum wage set by the law and 
are often not registered in the social security system.39  
 
For most migrants, the result of the segmentation of the labour market is the extreme 
insecurity and even destitution of a large majority of them. Only a skilled minority makes its 
way into the regular job market. Although studies are rare and most of them deal with the 
situation of domestic workers40 there is, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a 
recent concern among burgeoning NGOs and in the civil confessional and trans-confessional 
society for the (il)legal treatment they undergo from state authorities (especially from the 
Ministries of Interior and Justice) and employers’ organisations. Their lack of social and 
health protection, their often appalling housing conditions, their dreadful working conditions 
(ten hours a day, six days a week or more) and the meanness of their “salary” a part of which 
often remains in the hands of employers and middlemen are not new issues.41 However, 
they have only recently begun to draw public attention in relation to considerations on the 
meaning of democracy in Lebanon in comparison with neighbouring countries. In fact,  
                                                 
36 Ahmad Dirani, al-Marsad al-Lubnani li-huquq al-‘ummal wal-muwadhdhafin, interview 13 March 
2013. 
37 Ibidem. At Haytham, the oil company which belongs to the Shiite foundation Mabarrat, the 
Lebanese are employed to deliver gas and Asians for car wash. 
38 Elisabeth Longuenesse, Paul Tabar, unpublished preliminary research in food plants and cleaning 
firms in the Beirut district, February and March 2013. 
39 The Lebanese Salaire Minimum Interprofessionnel de Croissance (SMIC) was raised to $ 450 per 
month in January 2012. 
40 Nayla Moukarbel, 2009, Sri Lankan housemaids in Lebanon, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University 
Press; Kathleen Hamill, 2011, Traficking of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, Kafa, 
http://www.kafa.org.lb/StudiesPublicationPDF/PRpdf37.pdf accessed 25 January 2014. 
41 UNDP, 1997, A profile of sustainable human development in Lebanon, part III D. 
http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/library/democratic_governance/the-report--a-
profile-of-sustainable-human-development-in-lebano.html accessed 25 January 2014.  
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media campaigns and festive demonstrations against xenophobia have mobilized a new 
generation of militants sharing a common alienation from Lebanon’s traditional prejudices 
and political leadership.42   
Still, as underlined by all interviewees, nothing, or nearly nothing, of this has mobilized 
Lebanese labour unions.43 Rather, the GCLW is “naturally” inclined towards protecting 
Lebanese workers against lower-priced migrant competition.44 Union leaderships “advocate 
for the rights of the Lebanese workers before the government in order to regulate the flow 
of migrant workers and preserve them from the migrant labour competition.”45 They refuse 
to get involved in the support of foreign workers and the protest against their legally 
organised insecurity.46 In return, less than 1 percent of non-Lebanese toilers join unions 
although they are legally entitled to become simple (i.e. non-voting non-eligible) members.47  
While the labour association was among the main actors of the political scene before 1975 
when it enjoyed the support of powerful leftist parties, it is now shattered and weakened by 
a deadly sectarian competition. The GCLW went as far as ruling out the salary rises and other 
measures in favour of the working class proposed by Minister Nahas in 2012, in order to 
please its powerful political patrons, so fighting for the rights of migrant workers would be a 
far more remote objective. Yet, the exclusion of foreigners from the benefits of public 
welfare has several lopsided effects on the domestic labour market besides its harmful 
effects on the migrant market. It raises the domestic unemployment rate as it excludes from 
unskilled Lebanese workers from the labour market since they are not likely to accept the 
same terms as foreigners as they (unlike most foreign workers) have to pay rent and other 
expenses and want to be covered by social security. In the long run, the recourse to cheaper 
labour does not translate into tangible economic and social benefits for Lebanese citizens 
                                                 
42 Telling examples are the 2012 antidiscrimination internet campaign Shayef halek? (“Can you see 
yourself?”) http://www.cheyef7alak.com/ accessed 25 January 2014 and the Jadaliyya video, 2012, 
Racism and segregation at the Lebanese beaches, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/6430/racism-and-segregation-at-lebanese-beaches-(video) 
accessed 25 January 2014. 
43 I was told of an attempt by the Progressive Socialist Party (led by Druze chief Walid Junblatt) to 
raise the issue; of a failed joint mobilization of Lebanese drivers and foreign cleaners at Sukleen in 
downtown Beirut during Muhammad Fneish’s ministry (July 2008 – Nov 2009); and of a recent joint 
strike in an Ouza’i factory. 
44 Young, p. 52. 
45 Sensenig-Dabbous, Hourani, op.cit. p. 40. 
46 Ahmad Dirani, 10 March 2013. 
47 Youssef Harb, head of the Textile and Leather branch in FENASOL, interview, 14 March 2013. 
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since their salary remains low while the employment of cheap foreign labour is not reflected 
in lower prices.48 
 
 
Tacit and active complicity in a “mafia-style” networking 
Migrant workers are the main losers in the current Lebanese process of deregulation of the 
labour market and the general paralysis of social movements, as confirmed by every study 
on their living conditions and net financial gains after reimbursing expenses for recruitment, 
travel, accommodation and sometimes residence and work permit.49 Like the Lebanese 
workers and unions, but for other reasons, they are tacit participants in a global economy of 
labour substitution for the sake of entrepreneurs and managers. The threat of physical and 
symbolic violence plays a major role in their acquiescence as an overwhelming majority 
remains ‘illegal’  both in terms of residence and/or of work (an interviewee spoke of 75 
percent of workers working illegally in the construction sector) and very frequently deprived 
of their passports, while unchecked xenophobic attacks make victims among them every 
week. Nevertheless, Asian and African foreign workers are more numerous every year in 
Lebanon where the economy of manpower importation is flourishing.  
A full study of this economy would require minute concrete observations of the numerous 
agents involved in the process beyond critics of the modern world-system and humanitarian 
stances. As Mark Granovetter has observed, each of these agents takes part in a 
transnational network made of a “chain of small scale interactions.”50 Families, churches, 
unions and associations, local authorities and national officials, especially embassies, police 
and immigration service officials, employment agencies in the sending and receiving 
countries, brokers, travel agencies, smugglers, traffickers and even NGOs, not to mention 
the workers and employers themselves… each of them shares in the formation and 
operating of powerful transnational networks whose benefits s/he pursues for his/her own 
                                                 
48 UNDP 1997, part III D. 
49 Most of the migrants finance their trip by raising resources through family sources, 
mortgaging/selling their property including house/land, taking loans at very high rates of interest or a 
combination of these. Seema Gaur, 2010, “ Indian Labor Migrants in Lebanon: A Comparative Study 
of Migrants from Punjab and Tamil Nadu,” Washington, D. C., The Middle East Institute, 
http://www.mei.edu/content/indian-labor-migrants-lebanon-comparative-study-migrants-punjab-
and-tamil-nadu accessed 25 January 2014. 
50 Mark Granovetter, 1973, “The strength of weak ties,” American Journal of Sociology 78 (6), pp. 
1360-80. 
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sake.51 Informality and illegality are the key characteristics of the functioning of these trans-
boundary networks that escape international regulation. In the case of Lebanon, they also 
escape loose national regulation because the state is fragmented, weak, and dominated by 
private interests.  
A leading Lebanese political actor considers the system organising the inclusion of foreign 
workforce in the Lebanese economy as a “mafia-style network.”52 Indeed, what is occurring 
today in and around Lebanon fits the model discussed by Kyle and Koslowski: “Tacit and 
active complicity is required by a range of people in the sending and destination regions… 
Smugglers and traffickers … are deeply integrated into the social fabric of indigenous 
settings… and are facilitated by a loose network of recruiters, middlemen, actual smugglers, 
local and foreign financiers, and government officials and police…”53 Following their 
hypotheses I will now discuss the three main features that characterize the foreign labour 
market in Lebanon: privatization, commodification, and de-territorialisation. 
 
First, the logic of the free market imposes itself over any other consideration along the chain 
of migration and foreign employment, all the more so in Lebanon where traditional laissez-
faire policies were further fostered in the 1990s and 2000s reconstruction period.  Better 
known in the Gulf countries, the sponsorship (kafala) system governs the foreign worker 
market in Lebanon as well as in other Arab countries such as Syria, Jordan and Israel. It 
allows the externalization by the state of an important part of the control over the migrants 
in favour of employers and recruiters, and consequently “embodies the importance of 
private actors in migration management.”54 In the Lebanon of the 2010s, where political 
paralysis freezes the adoption of the yearly national budget and blocks decisions about 
structural reform there is hardly any national economic policy beyond the priority given to 
the banking and real estate sectors, even less an immigration policy beyond the rejection of 
Palestinian tawtin and the Syrian presence. Therefore, the decision to recruit foreign 
                                                 
51 N. M. Shah, 1995, “Emigration dynamics from and within South Asia,” International Migration 33 
(3/4), pp. 559-625. 
52 « Un maillage mafieux », interview, March 2013. ILO officers disagreed with the formulation. 
53 David Kyle, Rey Koslowski, 2011, “Introduction,” in D. Kyle, R. Koslowski (eds.), Global 
human smuggling: Comparative perspectives, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 1-7. 
54 Mehran Kamrava, Zahra Babar (eds.), 2011, Migrant Labour in the Gulf. Working group summary 
report, Doha, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign 
Service in Qatar,  http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/qatar/cirs/migrantlaborsummaryreport.pdf 
accessed 25 January 2014. 
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manpower in branches of activity such as agriculture, services and small industries does not 
depend on the existence of national manpower in these sectors nor does it respond to a 
national scheme to develop them. Rather, it depends on the comparative advantage offered 
by foreign toilers over nationals from the point of view of individual entrepreneurs.  
Although national labour laws apply in principle to migrants also55 the employer and/or 
broker (kafil) imposes all kinds of unfair terms of working conditions, wages and limits of 
mobility (end of contract; holding of passport …) on their foreign employees. He/she possibly 
avoids legal duties by outsourcing workforce i.e. turning to interim and importing agencies–
thus gaining a comfortable margin of freedom and benefit; the same margin is withheld 
from his employees.   
 
 
 
28 April 2013. Migrant workers rally in Beirut, demanding an end to the current sponsorship system 
in Lebanon (Photo Sabah Haider)56  
                                                 
55 The Lebanese Labour code (1946, amended in 1993) applies to foreign workers except in 
agriculture and domestic employment. Foreign workers are entitled to receive health coverage 
during the period of their contract. 
56 According to a Kafa official, abolishing the kafala system in Lebanon would help employers as well: 
"The relationship should be of an employer and an employee protected under labor law that ensures 
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Inevitably, the privatization of the foreign labour market opens the way to informality and 
illegality in the status, activities, wages and movement of immigrants.57 Administrative 
controls are rare and hindered by powerful political bosses, and employers feel free to 
impose their terms on workers who mostly do not read Arabic and urgently need a salary. In 
return, a large proportion of imported workers quit their jobs before the end of their 
contracts in order to escape severe working conditions and heavy reimbursement charges. 
Many stay in Lebanon and find another wild contract in another company or work free-lance 
as they cannot get hold on their passport until they reimburse their kafil. Also, in order to 
alleviate the payment of sojourn and work permits, import agencies (Lebanese makatib al-
‘amal) recruit unskilled immigrants for domestic or cleaning work and send them as full 
workers in remote industrial areas in the North or the Beqaa valley.58 As mentioned earlier, 
around two thirds of the foreign workers participating in the Lebanese economy work in the 
informal sector. The cost for individual workers in terms of health and retirement pensions is 
immeasurable. It is also heavy for the Lebanese state in terms of tax evasion. Besides, it 
raises issues of national security, since the Security Directorate lacks the means to monitor 
the composition and size of the current populations living in the country and the internal 
security forces and police are not prepared to guarantee their safety when they are 
confronted with deep racial prejudices. If one considers the logic of the government, and the 
security aspect of the management of the population, the question of who is a foreigner 
becomes primordial in the end.59 It adds to the existing population segmentation and 
threatens the social pact between state and society. I will examine how this process of 
privatization affects the national identity of Lebanon In the third part.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
a minimum wage and better insurance and working hours for the workers. Abolishing the Kefala 
system would enable both parties to end their relationship without a penalty." 
http://womensenews.org/story/labor/130430/workers-day-in-lebanon-targets-kefala-
system#.UYt377Umsm9 accessed 25 January 2014. 
57 Julien Bret, 2007, Circulation transnationale et travail disqualifié au Moyen-Orient. Les travailleurs 
non-arabes au Liban, Hommes et Migrations n° 1266, pp. 96-107 ; Binod Khadria, 2009, India 
Migration report 2009: Past, present and the future outlook, New Delhi, Cambridge University Press. 
58 Youssef Harb, head of the Textile and Leather branch in FENASOL, interview, 14 March 2013. 
59 This idea is borrowed from Françoise Mengin, 2008, “Taiwan as the Westphalian Society’s 
Foucaldian Heterotopia”, Sociétés Politiques Comparées 5, p. 16. 
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Secondly, the Lebanese situation suggests that, rather being the result of negotiations and 
deals between migrant workers with their social capital, and local production managers with 
their economic rationale, migrant employment is a fluid and uncontrolled process. Myriads 
of “exogenous” key actors interfering at every juncture of the migration network are the 
decisive actors in international labour migration. 60 These intermediaries of all sorts govern 
the migration network; they turn foreign manpower into a commodity and manpower 
import into a trade. They extract value from migrants as well as businessmen and share the 
profit of this commercialization between themselves. 61 
Private employment agencies may not be the most powerful agents along the network but 
they are certainly pivotal. While thousands of kilometres apart, recruiting offices in the 
sending country and placement offices in Lebanon can be considered “two sides of the same 
coin.”62 A main asset of their business is the bulk of information these agents master along 
the network and do not share with their “clients”– both employers and employees – in order 
to beguile them.63 Here again migrant trade operates on the border of illegality either 
because legislation is complex (for example migrant workers who wish to regularize their 
residence situation by paying taxes to the Ministry of Interior cannot do so without 
jeopardizing their current situation); or it is incomplete (as neither minimum wage nor social 
security apply to foreigners according to Lebanese law); or because the authorities are 
unable/unwilling to enforce it: for example, migrant workers arriving in Lebanon see their 
passport confiscated by their kafil, although this discriminatory measure has been 
repeatedly condemned by the UN and fought by local human rights lawyers.64 
The role played by political and social (sectarian and family) elites in enforcing, overseeing 
and cashing in on the foreign labour trade fits well with the traditional political economy of 
                                                 
60 Fred Krissman, 2005, “Sin Coyote Ni Patrón: Why the "Migrant Network" Fails to Explain 
International Migration,” International Migration Review 39 (1), pp. 4-44. “Government officials and 
their agents, employers and their supervisors, moneylenders, smugglers, landlords, and even many 
neighbors, coworkers, and acquaintances are all exogenous to the Massey model. In addition, many 
of these actors participate in migration networks for reasons that have nothing to do with altruism; 
these networks function for more purposes than familial affection or mutual aid” (p. 25). 
61 N. M. Shah, 1995, “Emigration Dynamics from and within South Asia,” International Migration 33 
(3/5), pp. 559-625. 
62 Samira Trad, interview, Ruwwad, 5 November 2012. 
63 Khadria, op.cit. p. 30. 
64 Gulnara Shahinian, UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, 2012, Mission to 
Lebanon Report, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/149/40/PDF/G1214940.pdf?OpenElement accessed 25 January 
2014. 
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the “Merchant Republic.” Until today, there has been no systematic study of the “collusive 
transactions”65 linking political leaders to the business elite in order to facilitate the 
exploitation of foreign manpower at lowest cost. Yet, many observers agree that what they 
denounce in the domestic labour field as exploitation also takes place in the imported labour 
market, only in worse conditions. Sectarian and political leaders use their positions as 
lawmakers to facilitate administrative arrangements in favour of their business partners or 
for their own sake.66  The burying of Minister of Labour Boutros Harb’s proposed legislation67 
in the parliamentary sands and the rejection of Minister of Labour Charbel Nahas’ 
aforementioned reform by Najib Miqati’s government are telling examples. The rationale 
behind such tactics is to raise entrepreneurs’ immediate profits in spite of the fact that “the 
reduction of production costs by employing cheap unskilled unmotivated manpower locks 
the structure of the economy into low productivity, low value-added jobs and low wages.”68  
While agencies and political leaders play a leading role in the labour trade, making profit by 
selling foreign manpower is tempting for every actor along the migration network in a 
context of neoliberal globalization, even for the migrant workers themselves. Obviously, in 
the short term, many migrant workers appreciate their freedom from monthly taxes and 
social security contributions, and are therefore prepared to choose illegal networks.69 Here, 
the hiding or distortion of useful information by network operators plays a decisive role. A 
comparative study of Tamil and Punjabi workers in Lebanon showed that the former were 
mostly brought in by agencies on legal visas and were employed in the organized sector. 
While they were deprived of part of their wages, they migrated in relatively secure 
conditions. For their part many Punjabis had their migration arranged through a close family 
member already living in Lebanon. While such arrangement seemed to guarantee savings 
and security, early immigrants actually played the role of agents, obtaining sponsorship and 
                                                 
65 Dobry, op. cit. p. 110. 
66 The struggle of Spinneys supermarkets’ employees against their manager in 2012 revealed that 
sectarian leaders from various regions had ownership of the land where the retailer’s branches were 
installed. Only a small minority of foreign workers was involved in the struggle, and there was hardly 
a mention of their particular fate in the press. See the reports in al-Akhbar from August 2012 to 
January 2013. Also Elisabeth Longuenesse and Paul Tabar’s unpublished field work (2013) shows that 
local political forces are able to impose quotas of national and sectarian groups in neighbouring 
factories. 
67 Marlin Dick, 11 February 2011, “Harb drafts laws to protect domestic workers”, The Daily Star. 
68 Kawar, Tzannatos, op. cit. pp. 6-7. 
69 According to IDAL (Investment Development Authority), employees’ contribution should be 2 
percent of their monthly wage. 
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work permits from local employers and selling them to prospective migrants in the name of 
family and friendship ties.70 In the end, if the Punjabis did better in Lebanon than the Tamils, 
it was thanks to the higher social capital that they had acquired before their departure from 
India. Their living conditions and financial gains were not improved, in fact the reverse, by 
their use of informal migration channels. 
 
This leads to the third characteristic of the foreign labour market in Lebanon: The political 
economy of foreign employment has become de-territorialised, that is, operated by trans-
boundary actors and regulated by transnational networks. While this is a common 
characteristic of unskilled labour migration around the world, the process has been 
facilitated in Lebanon over the last thirty years. Non-Arab Asian migrants entering Lebanon 
were able to by-pass state sovereignty thanks to the ‘special relation’ linking Lebanon to 
Syria. Moreover, in the recent period, migration agents also made extensive use of the 
internet to organise and protect their businesses. Both the recourse to a neighbour’s soil and 
dealing through the Internet are indications of the de-territorialisation of the labour 
migration process. 
Among illegal foreign workers, a telling number have entered Lebanon by crossing the land 
border between Syria and Lebanon.71 Indeed traffickers in manpower were able to fly 
workers into Syria, since governments such as India had good relations and favourable 
customs agreements with the Ba’thist regime, allowing employment agencies to open 
branches in Damascus. Only on their arrival at Mezzeh airport would newcomers understand 
that Syria was not the end of their journey even when the company supposed to hire them 
had Syrian headquarters. This meant that many Asian migrants purchased their visas for 
Syria and most of their journey remained within a legal framework. Still, for the last part of 
their journey, they had to walk across the Syrian Lebanese border, led by local smugglers 
who relieved them of their last dollars and sometimes of their passports. Unlike the Syrian 
workers who were free to cross back and forth over the border under the condition of 
paying public taxes and private fees, Asian (and African) migrants entered the land of 
                                                 
70 Gaur, op. cit. p. 6. 
71 This information is available in global studies (Young; Sensenig-Dabbous, Hourani) and was 
confirmed by an anonymous employee in Caritas interviewed in Jisr el-Basha on 14 March 2013. 
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illegality where they remained trapped until they became able to reimburse months and 
years of sojourn permit and the price of their passage.  
It is necessary to point out that labour smugglers are generally far from the outlaws and 
other kinds of bandits imagined by state employees and international experts in distant 
offices. Before the Syrian uprising of 2011, passage across the Syrian Lebanese border was 
sponsored by Syrian and Lebanese top political leaders and military officers, and controlled 
by police and customs administrations from both states that taxed them on their way, as 
testified in most victims’ narratives. In addition, it was not until relatively recently that most 
South Asian states had functioning embassies in Lebanon, with sections to care for 
expatriates’ interests. Local “honorary consuls” were said to attend to their own financial 
business–even by participating in the immigration racket – rather than to the interests of the 
nation they were supposed to represent.72 Even now, these embassies do not have the 
concrete means to check the delivery of work permits and migration movements of their 
nationals in Lebanon.73 
Finally, the de-territorialisation of labour migration does not consist only of the capacity of 
trans-boundary actors to get around the rules and legal power on the ground. Increasingly, it 
consists of a dematerialisation of the migration network through electronic communication 
and the negotiating and striking of deals whose participants are as efficient as they are 
inaccessible. Typing “Asian workers for Lebanon” in to a web search engine leads to buoyant 
e-commerce websites with suggestive names, administered in China, Malaysia or elsewhere. 
Tens of companies often splintered between “mother” and “franchise” branches all over the 
Middle East and South Asia declare their business as “staffing for the construction and oil 
and gas industry” and “providing skilled and non-skilled workers along with caravans and 
their tools.” Contacted by phone (their physical address was impossible to locate) “legal 
representatives” of employment agencies in Beirut were eager to promote themselves as 
graduates of Business departments at obscure American universities. They were willing to 
discuss deals such as “providing 40 unskilled Nepalese for a cleaning enterprise in Beirut” 
but soon retracted when understanding my inquiry was only academic. Although limited, my 
                                                 
72 For example, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Ethiopia briefly forbade labour expatriation to Lebanon 
when they took direct charge of their interests in Beirut. For details see Young, op.cit., pp.16-8. 
73 This led one of our interviewees to denounce the complicit and corrupt role paid by diplomats 
from the sending countries. Beirut, 20 March 2013. 
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probe into such a complex network suggests that transnational networks dealing with 
human labour are at the forefront of aggressive financial capitalism.  
 
 
On the future of Lebanon’s identity and sovereignty 
Besides the steadily growing labour immigration discussed in this chapter, Lebanon is 
experiencing an important emigration, especially of skilled manpower, which grew rather 
than decreased after the ceasefire in 1990. Experts estimate that more than half a million 
people emigrated from Lebanon between 1975 and 1995.74 40 percent of this emigration 
consisted of highly qualified young people,75 as the rate of unemployment increased during 
the so-called reconstruction period, especially the unemployment of skilled workers, making 
universities a mere “export industry.”76 Mary Kawar comments on this trend by showing that 
“specific factors contributing to a low level of labour demand and skills include 
macroeconomic uncertainty, poor governance, corruption, and weak public infrastructure,” 
thus locking the private sector “in a low productivity and low-wage equilibrium.”77  
To this day, the migration deficit of Lebanon has remained understated because the balance 
of remittances has stayed positive: Remittances from Lebanese abroad amounted to $7.2 
billion in 2009 (20 percent of GDP) while outward remittances flows were estimated at $5.7 
billion (17 percent of GDP).78 Still, the human dimension is striking: the World Bank put the 
stock of emigrants at 664.1 thousands (15.6 percent of the population) for 2010 and the 
stock of immigrants at 758.2 thousands (17.8 percent).79 Lebanon therefore became a labour 
                                                 
74 Kamal Hamdane, 2000, “Assurer du travail pour le retour des personnes qualifiées,” in 1996 
Symposium at AUB on The Return of qualified Lebanese migrants, Beirut, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
p. 44 
75 Hassan Jouni, 2010, La migration hautement qualifiée au Liban, CARIM Report, 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13677/CARIM_ASN_2010_23.pdf?sequence=1 
accessed 25 January 2014; Kawar, Tzannatos, op. cit. p. 9 (quoting a 2011 WB report): « Lebanon has 
the highest emigration and skilled emigration in the Arab world.” 
76 Central Administration of Statistics, 2007, National survey of household living conditions 2004-5, 
ch. 3 pp. 55-7, http://www.bloggingbeirut.com/docs/chapter3.pdf accessed 25 January 2014. 
77 Kawar, Tzannatos, op. cit. p. 6: “Specific factors contributing to a low level of labor demand and 
skills include macroeconomic uncertainty, poor governance, corruption, and weak public 
infrastructure.” 
78 World Bank, 2011, Migration and Remittances factbook 2011,     
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1199807908806/Lebanon.pdf 
accessed 25 January 2014. 
79 Ibid, p. 159. 
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surplus economy at both ends; the duality in its workforce “consists on the one hand, of 
highly skilled job seekers who often emigrate and, on the other hand, of low-skilled job 
seekers who usually remain in the country and are employed at low wages.”80 
An interesting and rarely noticed point in Kawar’s remarks concerns the changing identity of 
the workforce and the labour market in general. It is not only that foreign immigration 
overtook national emigration in the recent years. Kawar writes that “*migrant+ low-skilled 
job seekers (…) usually remain in the country,” thus inducing a steady and significant change 
in the sociological composition of the local population. In Beirut as in Hong-Kong and in 
other big buoyant cities of Asia, foreign migrants have gained visibility in the public space, 
especially on Sundays when local families remain at home and socialise privately. In 
suburban districts such as Dora in Beirut it is common to see migrants out and about. Here, 
banks, restaurants and cafés, food markets, shopping malls, medical and social centres 
connect them to their fellow nationals and their home countries. At the same time they 
transform the urban landscape and reveal themselves as real and visible inhabitants of 
Lebanon. Assaf Dahdah’s fine anthropological study of non-Arab women migrants in Greater 
Beirut81 shows how “in the context of high segregation and fragmentation that characterizes 
Beirut, *these migrants+ contribute in the interstices of the legality and of the city to its ‘re-
creation’ as a new figure of ‘citadinity’”. In the district where these migrants invent new 
forms of public space, local and global stakes interweave in a process of “glocalisation” and 
contribute at the same time to shape new Lebanese national stakes.  
Indeed, identity tensions mixed with class tensions have grown along the visibility of foreign 
workers. The reverse face of the process of re-cosmopolitization of Beirut82 is the spreading 
of xenophobic reactions and racist crimes that strike Syrians in particular but do not spare 
newcomers from Asia and Africa. Parallel with the splitting of the labour market, one can 
observe the spatial and social segmentation of the society, building an invisible barrier 
between the Lebanese and other inhabitants of Lebanon. As underlined by a majority of my 
interviewees, only new NGOs acting under the influence of sister-bodies in the politically 
                                                 
80 Kawar, Tzannatos, op. cit. p. 4. 
81 Assaf Dahdah, 2012, L’Art du faible. Les migrantes non arabes dans le Grand Beyrouth (Liban), 
Beirut, Presses de l’IFPO. For an English abstract see http://www.ifporient.org/node/1169 accessed 
25 January 2014. 
82 For a comparable example see William Berthomière, 2005, “The emergence of a cosmopolitan Tel 
Aviv,” Migracijske i Etničke Teme 21, pp. 243-53,  http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-
00573832/ accessed 25 January 2014. 
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correct international civil society mobilize against exploitation and racism. True, they are 
more active on the Internet than on the ground. The state for its part remains inactive as it is 
dominated by powerful networks of interests that take advantage of the situation. As for 
workers’ unions and leftist parties such as the LCP that should include migrants’ rights in 
their current protest movement–if only for the sake of their own members–they have failed 
to overcome the dominant popular feeling that foreign workers are a threat to the domestic 
labour market. Like the state, they remain trapped in corporatist segmented mobilizations 
imposed by confessional leaders and business interests.  
 
In spring 2013, growing tensions in Lebanese political life brought the government to a 
standstill after Najib Miqati’s resignation (25 March 2013) and exposed the hollowness of 
the upcoming general election. The damaging effects of the military spill-over of the Syrian 
crisis in the Lebanese arena function as a self-fulfilling prophecy as Salafis and Hezbollahis 
engage deeper every day in support of each of the Syrian fighting camps. This dangerous 
drift cannot but convince public opinion of the failure of the official policy of “dissociation” 
promoted by President Sleiman.83 For all varieties of Lebanese, Syria remains the key to all 
evils or solutions in Lebanon eight years after its military withdrawal. There are few 
observers and leaders who dare to acknowledge that the reason why the Syrian crisis 
exposes and shakes Lebanon more than other neighbouring countries such as Jordan and 
Turkey is to be found in Lebanon itself. Indeed, as this study has showed, Lebanon’s 
vulnerability has to be understood in terms of domestic as much as external factors. It is 
related to the steady but hardly noticed change in the identity of its society and polity during 
the past decades, especially after the end of the wars between 1975 and 1990 when 
migration issues increasingly transformed economic trends, social stakes and finally the 
national political order. 
On the issues of employment, the reining in of foreign manpower and dealing with foreign 
workers, the Syrian crisis is crucial–probably more crucial than the situation of the 
Palestinian refugees. Indeed the crossing of the border by Syrian businesses and financiers in 
                                                 
83 International Crisis Group, Report 141, 13 May 2013, “Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon”, 
p. 30. 
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the wake of the 1963 Ba’thist coup,84 the massive and unruly participation of Syrian unskilled 
workers in national production since the 1990s,85 and the recent arrival of several hundred 
thousand Syrian refugees in Lebanon fed negative representations, impacted the strategies 
of economic actors and shaped state policy toward immigration. In this respect, the tense 
relation between Lebanese and Syrian workers on the labour market offers a dominant 
pattern for the treatment reserved for migrants of other origins notwithstanding the fact 
that their numbers and needs make the Syrians threatening competitors in a depressed 
labour market. 
 
Beyond renewing the social question in Lebanon, the migrant phenomenon contributes to 
the renewal of the national question because “immigration constitutes the limit of what 
constitutes the national state… Immigration *…+ reveals in broad light the hidden truth and 
the deepest foundations of the social and political order we describe as national.”86 A study 
of this question in Lebanon is beyond the scope of this chapter on migrant labour, workers’ 
mobilization and their failed cooperation. Yet a cluster of legal debates concerning the 
acquisition of Lebanese citizenship (to descendants of emigrants, to children of Lebanese 
women married to foreigners …) and political controversies on naturalization–especially 
after the 1994 decree87–underlines a slow but deep change in the composition of the 
population living in the country. The often-discussed confessional dimension in this change 
(namely the diminishing role of the Christian communities) combines with a crude socio-
economic dimension (the issue of poverty88) which the Lebanese authorities often prefer to 
acknowledge in terms of ethnicity (Arab vs. non-Arabs). They nurture the illusion of the 
temporary sojourn of migrants (and the future return of émigrés) in order to justify 
discriminatory policies of non-integration. Their short-sightedness conveys a defensive 
                                                 
84 Elizabeth Picard, 2006, “Managing identities among expatriate businessmen across the Syrian-
Lebanese boundary,”in Inga Brandel (ed.), State Frontiers, Borders and Boundaries in the Middle East, 
London, I. B. Tauris, pp. 75-100.  
85 John Chalcraft, op. cit, note 31. 
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87 Guita Hourani, “The 1994 Naturalisation decree,” http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/LEB-
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awareness of national identity because in Lebanon, as in the Gulf countries, “the migrants 
are the foil in relation to which the nationals perceive and define themselves.”89 Growingly 
concerned with their future, Lebanese workers use migrants as scapegoats rather than allies 
in their struggle against elusive trade networks. 
 
                                                 
89 Anh Nga Longva, op.cit. p. 184.  
